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“The more free-market oriented our economy, the greater its need for 
official financial supervision”. 





The severe turmoil in the most “advanced” financial markets that started in 
the summer of 2007 follows many deep and costly financial crises in the 
developing economies during the last twenty five years.  This more recent 
crisis, like previous ones, is the result of both: 
a) inherent flaws in the way financial markets operate – such as their 
tendency to boom-bust behaviour – and  
b) insufficient, incomplete and sometimes inappropriate regulation. 
Financial crises tend to be very costly from a fiscal point of view (i.e,, that 
of the taxpayer), from their impact on lost output and investment, and from 
their impact on people, many of whom are both innocent bystanders and 
poor. 
 
It is therefore urgent and important to reform financial regulation, so that it 
makes financial crises less likely in the future. Those new systems of 
financial regulation should attempt to deal with the old unresolved problem 
of inherent pro-cyclicality of banking as well as financial markets.  They 
should also deal with such new features as the growing scale and complexity 
of the financial sector, the emergence of new, as yet unregulated actors and 
instruments, as well as the increased globalization of financial markets. To 
do this adequately and to avoid regulatory arbitrage, regulation has to be 
comprehensive. 
 
It is these two broad principles, comprehensiveness and counter-cyclicality, 
that will provide the framework for our proposals, detailed below. 
                                                          
1 The paper is a draft of a chapter in a forthcoming book on the Financial Turmoil, edited by Joseph 
Stiglitz, Stephany Griffith-Jones and José Antonio Ocampo. 
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1. As regards comprehensiveness: for regulation to be efficient, it is essential 
that the domain of the regulator is the same as the domain of the market that 
is regulated. Furthermore, lender-of-last resort type facilities provided by 
national central banks are increasingly being extended to new actors and 
instruments during the current turmoil.  As a result, a corresponding 
expansion of regulation to actors and activities that have, or are likely to be, 
bailed out is essential to avoid moral hazard. At a European level, the ECB 
has been acting quickly and significantly in providing liquidity, but at this 
European level,  “the supervisory function has been almost lacking” (Padoa-  
Schioppa, 2008).The Financial Stability Forum (FSF, 2008) is 
recommending going further, via the establishment of swap lines among 
central banks to provide liquidity in different currencies during times of 
stress. Whilst the internationalization of lender-of-last resort facilities seems 
both inevitable and desirable, given European and globalized private 
financial players, it needs to be accompanied by a corresponding and 
considerable strengthening of the international dimension of financial 
regulation. If the latter is not done, moral hazard will significantly increase 
once again as financial activity and risk-taking will grow rapidly in areas 
where international regulatory gaps exist but there is implicit or explicit 
coverage by lender-of- last resort facilities. 
 
We will therefore propose comprehensive measures at two levels: 
 
a)transparency for all actors and activities. This will require both registration 
and disclosure of relevant variables for all financial institutions.   This is a 
pre-condition for comprehensive regulation, but one that will also benefit the 
counterparties of other financial market participants and investors, as well as 
macro-economic authorities and 
 
b)comprehensive and equivalent regulation, to cover all entities that invest 
or lend on behalf of other people, and all activities which they undertake. As 
we develop below, such regulation needs to be done in ways that protect 
both liquidity (which we propose could be done through liquidity 
requirements for individual institutions as well as required reserve holdings 
by all institutions with national or regional central banks) and solvency 
(which would be based on capital and would build – though improve – the 
existing Basle banking regulatory framework while widening its 
requirements to other financial institutions).  
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In fact, adequate liquidity and capital buffers are linked, as sufficient 
reserves, implying higher levels of liquidity in individual institutions and in 
the whole system, will alleviate the pressure on capital, in times of stress. 
 
 2. A key market failure in the financial system is the pro-cyclical behaviour 
of most financial actors, which leads to excessive risk-taking and financial 
activity in good times, followed by insufficient risk-taking and financial 
activity in bad times. As a consequence, a key principle and desirable feature 
for efficient regulation is that it is counter-cyclical, to compensate for the 
inherent pro-cyclical behavior of capital and banking markets. The 
desirability of such an approach has been increasingly stressed by 
international institutions, such as the BIS (2005, 2008) and leading 
academics (Ocampo and Chiappe, 2003: Goodhart and Persaud, 2008). This 
implies varying regulatory requirements for reserves, loan to asset value 
ratios, capital, provisioning against losses, etc according to the phase of the 
economic cycle; as discussed below, regulatory variables such as capital 
could thus be varied according to the growth of total assets, and/or the 
expansion of assets in particular sectors, e.g. loans for housing. As BIS 
Chief Economist, William White (2007) pointed out, this would use 
“monetary and credit data as a basis for resisting financial excesses in 
general, rather than inflationary pressure in particular.” 
 
The rest of this paper will (in section II) briefly outline the Federal Reserve’s 
policy failures and the evolution of the financial system (emphasizing more 
features in the U.S.) and their link with the origins of the financial crisis. It 
will then in Section III develop what we believe are the key principles and 
criteria for a financial regulation that minimizes systemic risk, and illustrates 
them with analysis of specific sectors (e.g. off-balance sheet transactions) 
and important issues (e.g. compensation schemes) Section IV develops our 




II. Deregulation, Systemic Change and Policy Failures 
 
 
After the eruption of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the summer of 2007, 
criticisms of past and present policies of the Federal Reserve and other 
regulatory authorities became more frequent.  In December 2007, the Fed’s 
belated proposals for regulating all mortgage lenders suggested that it was 
engaged in the proverbial closing of the barn door after the horses were out 
(Andrews 2007).  Why the Fed and other authorities had not thought such 
restrictions were needed earlier seemed evidence of their ideological 
commitment to deregulation rather than a pragmatic assessment of 
developments that could cause market disruption and systemic fragility. 
 
In the case of the Fed, ideology shaped policy outcomes beyond its failure 
either to condemn or control poor lending practices and fraud.  The Fed’s 
monetary influence weakened as it gave priority to deregulation and 
innovation and abandoned credit flows to the procyclical pressures of market 
forces, ignoring ways in which monetary policy itself had lost its ability to 
stabilize financial markets and the economy.  It paid no attention to the way 
that foreign capital inflows drove up the supply of credit and failed to notice 
the explosion of debt that unchecked credit expansion produced.  And, as 
debt soared, the Fed ignored the asset bubbles it fueled.   
 
Also ignored were critical changes in the structure of financial markets that 
eroded the ability of regulatory authorities to monitor markets and supervise 
individual institutions and their increasingly diverse activities.  Meanwhile, 
structural change also undermined the effectiveness of monetary tools used 
to transmit policy initiatives to the real economy and the Fed’s ability to 
conduct countercyclical operations.  As its bailout of Bear Stearns in March 
2008 made clear, the Fed recognized that it was facing a systemic crisis but 
struggled to act systemically.  Together with its failure to criticize and curb 
abusive lending practices, the Fed’s passivity in responding to major 
changes in financial structure and regulation contributed to the prolonged 
and pervasive reach of the credit crunch that the sub-prime mortgage 
defaults unleashed.   
 
The following discussion focuses on the policy failures of the Fed and other 
central banks, arguing that monetary authorities in advanced economies 
were complicit in creating the conditions that led to the crisis; that, in fact, 
the crisis could not have occurred absent the excessive liquidity they created. 
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While it is clear that the unprecedented escalation in leverage that increased 
the vulnerability of the financial system to a funding crisis was made 
possible by deregulation of many activities and products, that escalation also 
depended on the fuel supplied by loose monetary policy.   
 
Our evaluation of the monetary factors that contributed to systemic 
weakness and crisis leads us to argue that financial reforms must include a 
reassessment of the relationship between the central bank, the financial 
system and the economy.  In the recent, heady era of booms based on 
financial engineering, the impact of imbalances in credit flows to the real 
economy tended to be overlooked.  In the process, central banks and 
financial institutions seem to have forgotten that finance must serve real 
economic activity if its own soundness and stability is to survive.  
 
1. Liquidity, credit growth and asset bubbles 
 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the major stock indices in 2000, the Fed 
began to flood US markets with excess liquidity.  To address its concerns 
about the economy’s sluggish response to the stimulus already provided and 
the potential for deflation, it maintained a nominal federal funds rate of one 
percent from June 2003 through 2004 by generating a continuous stream of 
liquidity that pushed the real rate of interest into negative territory over the 
period.  As investors’ so-called “search for yield” intensified in the low 
interest rate environment, the unprecedented increase in the availability of 
funding spurred escalating amounts of leveraged speculation in the form of 
carry trades, where the effect of borrowing short-term at low rates is to drive 
down rates on the higher-yielding, long-term assets in which the funds are 
invested.  Excess liquidity was also reflected in narrowed risk premiums and 
eased credit standards – developments mentioned by former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan in his appearance before the Senate Banking 
Committee in February 2005 but without acknowledgment of their link to 
excess liquidity (Greenspan 2005). 
 
Before Greenspan’s testimony, the June 2004 Annual Report of the Bank for 
International Settlements had argued that there was in fact a direct link 
between accommodative monetary policies in the G-3 countries (the US, the 
Euro-area and Japan) and mounting liquidity in global financial markets.  
The Report pointed to quantitative measures such as the monetary base, 
broad money and credit to the private sector – all of which had expanded 
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rapidly since 1999 in a large group of countries – as clear evidence of 
exceptional liquidity growth.  Moreover, in 2003 the BIS had specifically 
criticized the Fed for creating a situation in which a potential US downturn 
could become more severe due to the domestic debt build-up encouraged by 
monetary ease and had published research establishing a link between asset 
bubbles and excessive credit growth.  It had also warned about increasing 
speculation, pointing to a rising volume of leverage in domestic and 
international financial systems in 2002 that was fueling the credit expansion 
(BIS 2002, 2003, 2004; Borio and Lowe 2002).  
 
The Fed and other central banks ignored the BIS’ warnings despite a major 
sell-off in bond markets in March 2005 that revealed an escalation in 
leverage and carry trade activities.  They made no effort to address the 
troubling link between excess liquidity and debt-financed speculation or the 
even more problematic connection between liquidity and credit growth.  
Oblivious to the final link in that chain – the asset bubbles inflated by debt – 
and lulled by stable indicators for wholesale and consumer prices, central 
banks took no action to deal with the inflation in asset prices. 
 
2. Leveraged capital flows and credit expansion 
 
Sizable, procyclical capital flows over the last two decades have played an 
important role in weakening the impact of changes in policy rates on the 
availability of credit in financial markets.  In the US, for example, raising 
the short-term policy rate in 2004 failed to halt the decline in long-term 
interest rates or prevent the flood of new borrowing that followed in 2005 
and 2006 – a period of exceptionally large capital inflows.  But the Fed’s 
efforts to revive credit flows and economic activity by lowering interest rates 
in a downturn had also proved unreliable as a result of capital outflows 
during the recession in the early 1990s.  At that time, relatively little of the 
Fed’s ample infusion of liquidity was transmitted to the real economy.  As 
interest rates fell, the search for higher yields by domestic and foreign 
holders of US assets had prompted outflows – mostly to Mexico – that 
prolonged the recession.  Credit growth resumed when the Fed raised 
interest rates in March 1994 and US and foreign investors returned to US 
assets, leaving Mexico in crisis. 
 
By the middle of the 1990s, the growth of cross-border carry trade strategies 
had further undermined the ability of the Fed and other central banks to 
7 
expand or curtail the transmission of liquidity to their national markets.2  
These strategies, triggered by interest rate differentials on assets 
denominated in difference currencies, increased the amount of leveraged 
speculation by financial institutions and fueled yet another set of asset 
bubbles to add to the string that began in Japan in the 1980s, moved through 
emerging markets in the 1990s and started to afflict the US and other 
advanced economies at the turn of the century.  The pattern that has 
developed over the last two decades suggests that relying on changes in 
interest rates as the primary tool of monetary policy can set off procyclical 
capital flows that tend to reverse the intended result of the action taken.  As 
a result, monetary policy no longer reliably performs its countercyclical 
function and its attempts to do so by changing the policy rate may even 
exacerbate instability. 
 
Throughout 2004 and 2005, for example, borrowing reached truly massive 
proportions both in the US and abroad.  The Fed’s measured increases in 
policy rates had no cooling effect on rising debt levels.  In fact, they spurred 
foreign private inflows into dollar assets at home and abroad by encouraging 
carry trade strategies that borrowed low interest rate yen to purchase higher 
yielding dollar assets.  Escalating speculation was reflected in record-
breaking growth in borrowing in external banking markets, the great 
majority of which was channeled to financial institutions and used for 
position-taking by commercial and investment banks and hedge funds (BIS 
2005, 2006). 
 
With capital flows into the US in 2005 rising to twice the amount needed to 
finance the current account deficit, the US assumed an entrepot function for 
global markets.  Excess flows into dollar assets triggered sizable outflows 
for investment in higher-yielding emerging market assets (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 2006).  As an excess of dollars from foreign investment on top 
of current account surpluses flooded their markets, central banks in those 
countries responded by buying dollars to brake their conversion into local 
currencies.  While their sterilized intervention strategies helped moderate a 
build-up in domestic liquidity, they also helped mitigate an appreciation of 
their currencies. 
 
But, needing to invest the dollars they had acquired, emerging market 
countries bought US treasury securities and other dollar assets and re-
                                                          
2 Low interest rates in one national market provided an incentive for carry trade strategies that used 
borrowings in that currency to fund investments in higher-yielding assets denominated in other currencies. 
8 
exported the problem back to the US.  The accumulation of dollar reserves 
by these countries augmented the highly liquid conditions in US financial 
markets, exerting downward pressure on medium and long-term interest 
rates and fueling another round of capital outflows from the US back to 
emerging markets as well as continued binge borrowing by US residents. 
 
While 2005 was an extraordinary year in terms of rising liquidity and debt, 
the pattern of capital flows that year was not unique.  Net foreign lending in 
US credit markets had averaged about 15 percent of the annual supply of 
funds from the mid-1990s through 2007 (Federal Reserve Flow of Funds).  
Nevertheless, the advent of monetary ease after 2001 introduced a new 
dynamic:  the generation of liquidity through the spill-over effects of 
leveraged cross-border investment lows.  The round-robin nature of those 
flows constituted a sorcerer’s apprentice scenario that was bound to lead to 
crisis when uncertainty – from whatever cause – threatened the highly 
leveraged financial sector’s need for funding. 
 
Meanwhile, the rising debt levels of private financial and non-financial 
sectors were threatening to burst the asset bubbles they had created.  The 
housing bubble that had become apparent in the US and was to burst in the 
second half of 2007 had been fueled by an extraordinary growth in debt with 
outstanding credit reaching 352.6 percent of GDP by year-end 2007, up from 
255.3 percent in 1997.  The rise in household debt over the same decade 
(from 66.1 to 99.9 percent of GDP) was both a key indicator of the debt 
bubble and of the growing threat it posed for future spending as debt service 
took a larger share of disposable income.  But the most dramatic 
development was the jump in the debt of the US financial sector to 113.8 
percent of GDP from 63.8 percent only a decade earlier (Ibid.).  While the 
increased borrowing by financial institutions signalled the rise in speculative 
leverage, it also reflected new funding strategies adopted by a profoundly 
changed financial system.  Those changes and their implications for 
monetary policy implementation constituted another critical development the 
Fed ignored. 
 
3. The slipping transmission belt for monetary policy 
 
Over the past 30 years, the US financial system has been transformed by a 
shift in household savings from banks to pension and mutual funds and other 
institutional investment pools.  Between 1977 and year-end 2007, the assets 
of all depository institutions plummeted from 56.9 percent to 23.7 percent of 
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total financial sector assets.  Meanwhile, spurred in part by the funding 
requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 
1974, the assets of pension funds and mutual funds rose from 21.0 percent to 
37.8 percent of the total as these institutional investors came to provide the 
dominant channels for household savings and investment flows (Table 1).3 
 
Table 1:  Outstanding Assets Held by Financial Sectors 
 
Amount ($ billions) 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 
Depository Institutions1 $287.0 $625.1 $1,716.6 $4,455.9 $6,546.5 $13,737.4 
Insurance Companies2 104.7 181.8 354.2 1,042.7 2,090.3 3,444.2 
Pension Funds3 64.4 194.3 580.8 2,458.5 6,479.2 10,699.1 
Mutual Funds4 13.1 51.8 56.8 815.3 4,177.8 11,170.4 
GSEs & Federally Related 

























Nonbank Lenders5 21.5 51.8 140.4 470.3 799.3 1,911.2 












Others6 0.1 0.8 5.1 198.9 524.4 2,033.9 
Total 504.3 1,146.2 3,046.6 6,640.0 25,228.8 57,938.9 
Percentage of Total  
Financial Sector Assets 
      
Depository Institutions1 56.9 54.5 56.3 41.5 25.9 23.7 
Insurance Companies2 20.8 15.9 11.6 9.7 8.3 5.9 
Pension Funds3 12.8 17.0 19.1 22.9 25.7 18.5 
Mutual Funds4 2.6 4.5 1.9 7.6 16.6 19.3 
GSEs & Federally Related 













Issuers of Asset-backed Securities    
  ----- 
  
  ----- 
 
  ----- 
 





Nonbank Lenders 5 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.4 3.2 3.3 












Others6    -----        0.1 0.2 1.9 2.1 3.5 
SOURCE:  Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 
1. Includes commercial banks, savings institutions and credit unions. 
2. Includes life and property-casualty insurance companies. 
3. Includes private pension funds, state and local government retirement funds and insured pension 
assets. 
4. Includes money market mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds and other mutual 
funds. 
5. Includes finance companies and mortgage companies. 
6. Includes real estate investment trusts and funding corporations. 
 
 
                                                          
3 The combined assets of pension and mutual funds as a share of financial sector assets were actually higher 
in 1997 (42.3 percent) when pension fund assets were 25.7 percent of the total than in 2007 when pension 
funds’ holdings slipped to 18.5 percent. 
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The shift in individual savings from banks to pension and mutual funds 
produced a symmetrical increase in business borrowing through capital 
markets.  Credit flows to households also moved into the capital markets as 
mortgage originators such as banks, savings and loan institutions and 
brokers bundled individual mortgages into pools and sold securities based on 
those pools to investors.  Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and federally related mortgage pools played 
major roles in facilitating this securitization process.  Meanwhile, asset-
backed securities (ABS) issuers used securitization techniques to fund car 
loans and other consumer receivables.  In the twenty year period between 
1987 and 2007, the assets of GSEs and mortgage pools – primarily holdings 
of mortgages for single-family housing – rose from $1.0 trillion to $7.6 
trillion while assets of ABS issuers jumped from $118.3 billion to $4.7 
trillion.   
 
The implications of these shifts in saving and credit flows have radically 
altered the way the financial sector functions, reducing the role of direct 
lending in favor of trading, investment and asset management.  Their impact 
on the transmission of monetary policy initiatives has been profound and 
was already evident in 1993.  At that time, former Fed Chairman Greenspan 
noted that “the fairly direct effect that open market operations once had on 
the credit flows provided for businesses and home construction is largely 
dissipated”; that while the Fed “can still affect short-term interest rates, and 
thus have an impact on the cost of borrowing from banks, from other 
intermediaries, and directly in the capital markets…..this effect may be more 
indirect, take longer, and require larger movements in rates for a given effect 
on output” (Greenspan 1993, p.3).  At the same 1993 conference, former 
Bundesbank Vice President Hans Tietmeyer’s view was somewhat gloomier.  
He argued that, in a number of countries, deregulation and financial 
innovation had altered the transmission mechanisms for monetary policy to 
the real economy and had “generally made it more difficult for monetary 
policy makers to fulfill their stability mandate” (Tietmeyer 1993, p. 407). 
 
Subsequent events have underscored the accuracy of these remarks.  In the 
15 years since they were made, however, the major central banks have taken 
no steps to improve the monetary transmission mechanism.  On the contrary, 
they countenanced further innovation and deregulation and promoted the 
view that market-based solutions – the Basel Agreement on capital 
requirements, for example – could replace the quantity controls (reserve and 
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liquidity requirements, lending limits and capital controls) that had been 
targeted for removal by the advocates of liberalization.   
 
As the BIS and others have argued, a prerequisite for stabilizing the crisis-
stricken global economy is reinstating countercyclical policy initiatives.  We 
argue that this will require both the introduction of countercyclical 
regulatory reforms and quantitative monetary tools and extending their reach 
to all segments of the financial system.  As discussed in the following 
sections, the introduction of comprehensive, countercyclical regulatory 
strategies will bolster the effectiveness of monetary policy implementation 
by addressing the inherently procyclical bias of the market-based financial 
system that has evolved in the US and global markets over the last thirty 
years.    
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III. Criteria and Principles for financial regulatory reform; 
Some applications 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, there are two broad principles, 
comprehensiveness and counter-cyclicality, that need to be adhered to, so 
that financial regulation is effective in helping ensure financial stability and 
avoid crises. 
 
1. Regulation has to be comprehensive 
 
One of the main causes of the current crisis is the fact that effective 
regulation covers a diminishing share of total capital and banking markets. 
As Damon Silvers, Counsel to the AFL-CIO (2008) put it, “the regulatory 
system is a kind of cheese, where the regulatory holes gradually get larger.” 
 
As is often the case it has been true in this crisis that the parts of the 
financial system that were not regulated at all, or were regulated too lightly, 
have generated more problems. Because of regulatory arbitrage, growth of 
financial activity (and risk) moved to unregulated mechanisms (SIVs), 
instruments (derivatives) or institutions (hedge funds). However, though 
unregulated, those parts of the shadow financial system were de- facto 
dependent on systemically important banks via provision of credit, 
guaranteed liquidity lines or other commitments.  
 
A clear example where lack of capital requirements led to excessive growth  
of unregulated mechanisms was that of SIVs (structured investments 
vehicles). It is very interesting that Spanish regulatory authorities allowed 
banks to have SIVs, but required Spanish banks to consolidate these special 
purpose vehicles in their accounting, implying that they had the same capital 
requirements as their other assets (Cornford, 2008; interview material). This 
eliminated the incentive for such vehicles to grow in Spain, nor did they 
become a major problem for banks as SIVs became in the U.S. 
 
It is positive that  Basle II, unlike Basle I, requires banks to set aside capital 
to support liquidity commitments to those vehicles; however, those 
commitments have lower capital requirements for short maturities; 
furthermore, the Basle Committee is reportedly planning to strengthen these 
capital requirements to reduce regulatory arbitrage incentives (FSF, 2008, 
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op. cit). Though positive, such measures would only be partial. A more 
comprehensive solution would be for all vehicles and transactions to be put 
on banks’ balance sheets; then there should be no regulatory arbitrage, as 
risk-weighted capital requirements would be equivalent for all balance sheet 
activities; furthermore, transparency could automatically became far more 
comprehensive for banks. 
 
This discussion of SIVs illustrates the fact that the only solution is for 
comprehensive and equivalent transparency and regulation of all institutions 
and instruments. This would discourage or even hopefully eliminate 
regulatory arbitrage and help prevent the build up of excessive systemic risk, 
which is essential for financial stability. As discussed in the Introduction, the 
widening of lender-of-last resort facilities – both national and international – 
that is occurring recently further justifies the need of a corresponding 
increase in comprehensiveness of regulation, to avoid moral hazard. 
 
The task of defining equivalent regulation on assets for all financial 
institutions and activities, both for solvency and liquidity is essential.4  
 
To be more specific, all entities that invest or lend on behalf of other people 
– using other people’s money directly or through some type of leverage – 
need to have relevant transparency requirements and need to be regulated. 
Within institutions, all their activities need to have equivalent regulation. 
Therefore, institutions like hedge funds need to be brought into the 
regulatory domain, as do all off-balance activities of banks. 
 
Specific steps have already been taken towards more comprehensive 
regulation; for example, U.S. authorities are addressing regulatory gaps in 
the oversight of entities that originate and fund mortgages, which is clearly 
welcome. As importantly, there is increasing support for the idea of 
comprehensive regulation. 
 
For example, an influential EU report (EU 2008) argues that financial 
regulation should be comprehensive; it especially emphasizes the need to 
regulate hedge funds and makes specific recommendations to limit the 
leverage of hedge funds to preserve stability of the EU financial system. 
Some of the most influential mainstream commentators (see, for example, 
                                                          
4 The technical aspects of how to calculate equivalent liquidity (e.g. reserves) and solvency (e.g. capital) 
requirements across different institutions and activities requires further study, both by institutions like the 
BIS and FSF, by national regulators, from both developed and developing countries and by academics. 
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Roubini, 2008 and Wolf, 2008) are forcefully arguing for comprehensive 
regulation of all relevant institutions and activities. For example, Martin 
Wolf writes; “If regulation is to be effective, it must cover all relevant 
institutions and the entire balance sheet in all significant countries. It must 
focus on capital, liquidity and transparency.” Furthermore, it is very 
encouraging that the U.S. Treasury March 2008 Blueprint for Financial 
Regulatory Reform (U.S. Treasury, 2008), though flawed in some aspects, 
put forward the idea that financial regulation should be comprehensive, 
including hedge funds and other private pools of capital. 
 
A key pre-condition for comprehensive regulation is comprehensive 
transparency of relevant variables. Transparency has also advantages for 
other actors, such as investors, other market agents and macro-economic 
authorities. 
 
2. Reducing asymmetries of information between markets actors and 
regulators is an essential pre-condition for better regulation. 
 
In many cases, regulators genuinely do not know the extent to which risks 
are increasing, and how these risks are distributed. The more complex and 
large the financial system the greater the opaqueness and the greater the 
difficulty to obtain information. Building on the work of Stiglitz (for 
example, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) there is a whole theoretical literature that 
shows market failures and incorrect incentives lead to private underprovision 
of information and monitoring by private actors, which gives a rationale for 
official sector intervention (see Kambhu, et al, 2007, for a view from the 
Fed).  
 
One example is complex and totally opaque OTC derivatives, which reach 
massive levels, as highlighted for example by the 2008 FSF report. Possible 
solutions would be to attempt to standardize such instruments but above all 
to channel them through clearing house based exchanges, as Soros (2008) 
suggests for the $45 trillion credit default swap contracts; currently those 
that hold the contracts do not know even whether those counterparties are 
properly protected with capital. This establishment of clearing houses or 
exchanges, should become obligatory for all OTC derivatives, this would 
have the benefits of ensuring appropriate margin and capital requirements on 
each transaction, as well as many other advantages.        
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It is interesting that an emerging country, Brazil, has been effective in using 
regulations and other measures to encourage derivatives to move to 
established exchanges (Dodd and Griffith-Jones, 2008). 
 
Another, somewhat related example for need for increased transparency is in 
the case of hedge funds (HFs); on this, there is growing consensus (including 
by the HF industry itself)) that improved information on HFs and other 
highly-leveraged institutions (HLIs) would also be valuable to investors, 
counterparties as well as regulators. As pointed out in a previous paper 
(Griffith-Jones et al., 2007), it seems appropriate for hedge funds to report 
market risk, liquidity risk and credit risk, as the Fisher II working group 
recommended. It also seems essential that HFs report aggregate world wide 
and country positions, the aggregate level of leverage, and especially the 
level of long and short positions, and others, such as the level of trading. 
 
In this context, it is encouraging that the UK FSA in June 2008 has 
introduced a tough disclosure requirement for anyone “short-selling” a 
significant amount of stock in a company conducting a rights issue; the 
requirements are stringent in that they oblige short sellers to disclose such 
positions if they amount to more than 0.25% of the total shares outstanding. 
This rule was introduced due to the strong suspicion that hedge funds were 
short-selling the stock of companies in the middle of rights issue, thus 
undermining the ability of banks to recapitalize themselves, which is 
essential for financial stability at present. 
 
It would seem desirable that such disclosure requirements on short and long 
positions should remain, should be generalized and become the norm 
internationally. 
 
It is also important to decide with what periodicity and to whom information 
is to be disclosed; additional important questions are whether this 
information should be provided by all HFs or only those systematically 
important. 
 
As regards periodicity of reporting, positions can be reported in real time or 
with a lag. Though real time reporting would be particularly useful it could 
be possibly costly, through much of this information must be already 
privately available. Real time reporting, if publicly available, can either 
enhance market stability, by encouraging contrarian positions; however, it 
also risks encouraging herding, if other market actors mimic the positions of 
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large actors, e.g. hedge funds (for a good discussions, see De Brower, 2001). 
The problem of fixed point in time disclosure is the risk of window dressing 
for the particular moments. The solution may be to require also maximum 
and minimum positions during this period, to avoid such window dressing. 
 
It would seem best if information would be made publicly available, e.g. on 
the internet. It may be sufficient if positions are reported in aggregate by 
class of institution, e.g. bank, securities firms, hedge funds, other HLIs, etc. 
The aggregate reporting would avoid revealing individual positions. 
 
It seems important to find an institution that would be efficient at collecting 
and processing speedily such data, without compromising confidentiality. 
The institution with the best experience in similar data gathering would be 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which already collects detailed 
information on banks and other financial institutions. The reputation of the 
BIS would also ensure confidentiality of individual positions. 
 
Though we have discussed issues of transparency and disclosure in relation 
to the most opaque actors (hedge funds) and transactions (derivatives), 
similar criteria need to apply to other opaque actors and, especially to the 
opaque parts of the banking system. 
 
3. Regulation has to be counter-cyclical  
 
It would seem that the most important market failure in financial markets, 
through the ages, is their pro-cyclicality. Therefore, it is essential that 
regulation attempts to compensate and curb this (particularly during booms 
when excessive risk is created) by pursuing counter-cyclical regulation. It is 
encouraging that finally there is growing agreement among academics, 
institutions like the B.I.S. (which in its’ 2008 Annual Report very forcefully 
argues for counter-cyclical regulation), and increasingly regulators, about 
the need for introducing counter-cyclical elements into regulation. It is 
noteworthy that the 2008 BIS Annual Report rightly argues that the trends 
toward globalisation, consolidation and securitisation, increase the 
probability of both excessive behaviour in the boom and costs in the bust, 
thus increasing the dangerous and negative side effects of financial market 
pro-cyclical behaviour. This adds additional urgency to introduce counter-
cyclical regulation. The questions now are not so much about if, but about 
how and when, counter-cyclical regulation is introduced. 
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As regards banks, Goodhart and Persaud (2008) have presented a specific 
proposal: increasing Basle II capital requirements by a ratio linked to recent 
growth of total banks’ assets. This is very important in that it provides a 
clear, simple and transparent rule for introducing counter-cyclicality into 
regulation of banks. Another virtue of this proposal is that it could be fairly 
easily implemented, in that it builds on Basle II. Finally, it has the advantage 
– at the heart of the concept of counter-cyclicality – of linking micro to 
macro-stability. 
 
In this proposal, each bank would have a basic allowance of asset growth, 
linked to macro-economic variables, such as inflation and the long-run 
economic growth rate. It would measure actual growth of bank assets as a 
weighted average of annual growth (with higher weights for recent growth). 
 
If such a rule is introduced, it is important that it be simple and done in ways 
that regulators cannot loosen easily, to avoid their becoming “captured” by 
the general over-enthusiasm that characterises booms. 
 
Three issues arise. Should the focus just be on increases in total bank assets, 
or should there also be some weighting for excessive growth of bank lending 
in specific sectors that have grown particularly rapidly (such as recently in 
real estate)? Often crises have arisen due to excessive lending during boom 
times to particular sectors or countries (e.g. emerging economies). However, 
most systemic bank failures have also been preceded by excessive growth of 
total bank assets. 
 
Second, is the best way to introduce counter-cyclicality through modifying 
capital adequacy requirements over time? Would not the alternative of 
increasing provisioning against future losses – as done in Spain and Portugal 
– be a good option, given that it has much merit, as argued by Ocampo and 
Chiappe (2003) as well as others? An advantage of using provisions is that 
their objective is precisely to finance expected losses (in this case through 
the business cycle) as distinguished from capital, whose objective is to cover 
for unexpected losses. A disadvantage of using provisions is that accountants 
object to provisioning of expected losses, especially for asset classes.  
As global accounting rules are defined, it would be desirable that they pay 
far more attention to balancing the aim of what is effective for individual 
and systemic bank stability with their current emphasis on providing 
information to investors. 
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Finally, there is the crucial issue of timing. It seems key to approve such 
changes soon, while the appetite for regulatory reform remains high. 
However, their introduction should be done with a lag, so as to avoid 
increased capital requirements (especially linked to the weighting given to 
growth in recent years in the G-P formula, which would be high) putting 
pressure on currently weak banks and accentuating the credit crunch. Indeed, 
leverage had to be reduced, but this needs to be done gradually. 
 
Some of the least regulated parts of the financial system may have some of 
the strongest pro-cyclical impacts, including on emerging economies. One 
such example is the role that hedge funds and derivatives play in carry trade; 
there is increasing empirical evidence that such carry trade has very pro-
cyclical effects (on over or under shooting) of exchange rates of both 
developed and developing economies, with negative effects often on the real 
economy (see Goyson, Stahel and Stulz, 2008, as well as Brunnermeir, 
Nagel and Peterson, 2008, for developed economies; see also, Dodd and 
Griffith-Jones, 2008 and 2006, for evidence on Brazil and Chile). 
 
For regulation to be comprehensive, as argued above, there should be 
minimum capital requirements for all derivatives dealers and minimum 
collateral requirements for all derivatives transactions, so as to reduce 
leverage and lower systemic risk. Collateral requirements for financial 
transactions function much like capital requirements for banks. 
 
As discussed above for bank regulation and would be true about introducing 
greater capital regulations for other actors, the issue of timing is crucial. 
Regulations need to be approved now, given greater appetite for regulation, 
but may need to be introduced with a lag, when financial institutions are 
stronger; doing so now, could weaken financial institutions further and/or 
accentuate the credit crunch. 
 
An issue to explore is whether regulation of derivatives’ collateral and 
capital requirements should also have counter-cyclical elements. This would 
seem desirable. It would imply that when derivatives positions, either long 
or short, were growing excessively (for example, well beyond historical 
averages), collateral and capital requirements could be increased. An issue to 
explore is whether this should be done for all derivatives (a far greater task, 
but consistent with our principle of comprehensiveness) or for derivatives 
that regulators think can generate systemic risk (shorting of banks’ shares) or 
policy-makers believe can have negative macro-economic effects (carry 
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trade leading to over or under shooting of exchange rates); the latter more 
manageable approach may unfortunately allow growth of derivatives that 
can have negative externalities, of which financial regulators and economic 
authorities are unaware at the time. 
 
More broadly, counter-cyclical criteria of regulation may need to be applied 
to regulations of all transactions and institutions. Besides doing this at the 
individual institutions or transaction level, it may be necessary, as the BIS 
(op. cit. 2008) argues, to put greater focus on systemic issues, such as many 
institutions having similar exposures to common shocks, and risks of 
contagion between markets and institutions. This is technically challenging, 
as regulatory requirements for individual institutions would not only need to 
reflect their own behaviour, but also reflect system–wide developments, 
such as increasing property prices. 
 
Finally, as argued below, counter-cyclical financial regulation is an 
increasingly important complement in the modern economy to counter-
cyclical monetary policy. Currently counter-cyclicality is insufficiently used, 
both in financial regulation and monetary policy, though more widely 
accepted in fiscal policy, especially in developed economies. 
 
4. Regulation needs to be as tightly co-ordinated internationally as possible. 
 
One of the easiest ways to do regulatory arbitrage is to move activities to 
other less regulated countries, especially offshore centres. This is 
particularly, though not only, true for OTC derivatives and hedge funds. 
 
The international community has made important and valuable steps in this 
direction. However, their efforts are clearly insufficient, given the speed and 
depth of globalisation of private finance, and its’ often negative spill-overs 
on innocent bystanders. 
 
The discussion of a global financial regulator needs to be put urgently on the 
international agenda (Kaufman, _; Eatwell and Taylor, _). In the meantime, 
efforts at increased co-ordination amongst national regulators requires top 
priority. It is also urgent that developing country regulators participate fully 
in key regulatory fora, such as the Basle Committee. Given their growing 
systemic importance, it is absurd and inefficient if they do not. 
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5. Compensation of bankers and fund managers needs to be self-regulated or 
regulated. 
 
As Stiglitz (2008) points out, incentive problems are at the heart of the 
boom-bust behaviour of financial and banking markets. A large part of 
bonuses are tied to short-term profits and are one-sided, positive in good 
times and never negative, even when big losses occur (Roubini, 2008). Such 
asymmetries seem even stronger in institutions such as hedge funds, where 
managers fees rise very sharply if profits are very high, but fall mildly with 
poor performance, encouraging excessive  risk-taking and leverage (Kambhu 
et al, 2007 op. cit and Rajan, 2005). 
 
There is increased consensus that high remuneration, and its’ link to short 
term profits, contributes to boom-bust behaviour of financial markets. Thus 
the FSF Report (2008, op. cit) quoted above recommends, that 
“Compensation arrangements often encouraged disproportionate risk-taking 
with insufficient regard to long-term risks.” Several senior figures in Wall 
Street and the City of London are arguing for a radical rethinking of 
compensation schemes (Lewitt, 2008). It is interesting that even the Institute 
of International Finance (that represents major banks) recognizes the same 
distortions caused by compensation schemes as the FSF Reports, though as 
could be expected it is opposed to regulators reforming compensation 
models (Cornford 2008). 
 
It is positive that the FSF Report recommends that regulators should work 
with market participants to mitigate risks due to inappropriate incentive 
structures. This is very encouraging, but it seems unclear that market 
participants will voluntarily accept such changes, due to collective action 
and other problems. 
 
There is another negative effect of short-term bonuses, less often 
highlighted. This is that in good times, banks and other financial institutions 
have very high profits, but a large part of these are not capitalized, or paid to 
shareholders. They are paid as very high bonuses. As Wall Street analyst 
Lewitt (2008) put it “Too much capital is allowed to exit banks in the form 
of cash compensation.” Banks are bled of capital in good times making less 
capital available in bad times. When a crisis comes, bail-outs occur to help 
re-capitalize the banks, paid by the public sector and ultimately by 
taxpayers. It in fact could be argued that taxpayers are paying ex-post for 
excessive bonuses. This gives an additional rationale for regulating 
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compensation structure. In fact, very high short-term bonuses are creating 
moral hazard for three reasons; firstly, they encourage excessive risk-taking. 
Secondly, by bleeding banks of potential capital, they make the need for 
costly public bail-outs more likely. Finally, if banks have losses due to 
excessive risk-taking, they may well, in the future, pay less taxes. These two 
latter effects are not traditionally reflected in the literature.  
 
There could be easy solutions to this problem, including providing only a 
fixed basic salary on a monthly basis, and accumulating bonuses in an 
escrow account like a short-term pension fund. These could be cashed only 
after a period equivalent to an average full cycle of economic activity has 
taken place, independently if the person stays with the firm or not. The 
incentives would change towards making medium or long term profits, and 
the excessive risk-taking linked to short-term bonuses – where large 
payments are obtained upfront and no costs are paid when losses take place 
– would be significantly reduced. 
 
There are of course some technical issues on how this could best be 
implemented. These could be quite easily overcome. However, the key 
problem will be political, to overcome the resistance of bankers and fund 
managers. Given the magnitude of the current crisis, its’ damaging effects on 
the real economy – especially in major developed countries – this may be the 
best of times to move forward. The self regulatory route (by the industry 
itself) could be tried, but we are sceptical it would bring meaningful results; 
action by regulators seems essential. In the long term, financial institutions 
and the financial system will actually benefit from a change in compensation 
schemes. It is the problems of externalities, collective action and principal 
agency that may inhibit market agents from reaching a better outcome from 
their collective perspective. Regulators therefore need to do it for them. This 
would benefit financial and macro-economic stability and even the stability 
of individual financial institutions. As argued above, there is also a case for 
regulating compensation to protect tax payers from possible future bail-outs, 
and from reduced tax payments by banks due to future losses.  
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IV:  LIQUIDITY AND SOLVENCY 
 
  
 Reform proposals put forward by national and international regulatory 
authorities have tended to include calls for banks and investment banks to 
raise capital to offset losses and write-downs on mortgages, mortgage-
backed securities and other assets that have fallen in value.  In these 
discussions, capital is viewed as the sole cushion for financial institutions 
and their shrinking capital base is increasingly viewed as a threat to systemic 
solvency.  The ongoing pressure on capital is also seen as impeding efforts 
to revive credit flows and maintain economic activity. 
 
The severity of the threat to institutional solvency led many to question the 
ability of the Fed and other central banks to defuse the credit crunch and 
stem the decline in asset prices.  Many assumed that the US problem had 
shifted from a liquidity crisis to a solvency crisis.  While a continuation of 
liquidity support is seen as necessary, that support appears to be of limited 
value in terms of either ending the crisis or moderating its current and 
potential negative impact on the real economy.  Solutions increasingly have 
turned to proposals for government intervention to protect the solvency of 
systemically important institutions.  
 
But beyond the immediate issue of crisis management, the complementary 
roles of central bank liquidity as well as capital and holdings of liquid assets 
as cushions for private financial institutions remain critical issues for reform.  
As discussed in Section III, reform proposals must include ways to 
restructure capital and liquidity requirements for depository institutions to 
moderate their procyclical impact and make them function as a 
countercyclical instrument of soundness regulation.  And, as discussed in 
section II, we believe that, given the sizable shift in savings and investment 
flows from banks to institutional investors, the transmission belt for both 
regulatory and monetary policy initiatives must be extended to reach all 
segments of the financial system.  In this section, we expand these 
discussions of institutional capital and liquidity and the liquidity cushion 
provided by central banks to indicate the direction we think further reform 
proposals should take to restore and bolster financial stability.  
 
1.  The role of capital in a market-based system 
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Assessments of the role capital plays in guarding the soundness of the 
financial system have tended to focus on the balance sheets of depository 
institutions.  It should be noted, however, that before 1983 there had been no 
statutory basis in the US for proscribing the amount of capital banks were 
required to hold against assets and capital requirements had tended to be 
ignored in most other countries as well.  With the threat of default and the 
proliferation of non-performing loans on developing country debt in the 
early 1980s, the US Congress directed the Fed to set limits on banks’ assets 
in relation to capital and this, in turn, led to negotiations with other 
developed countries that resulted in the adoption of the Basel Agreement on 
Capital Adequacy in 1988.     
 
But rules governing capital adequacy for banks have not provided the 
systemic protection that was expected.   Because of the rapid increase in 
outstanding securitized mortgages and other asset-based securities as well as 
the explosive growth of derivatives, trading and investment in marketable 
securities has become the dominant activity in US financial markets.  
However, as has been demonstrated repeatedly since the crisis erupted in the 
summer of 2007, marketability does not mean that an asset can be sold at the 
expected price – or even sold at all – and the wider applicability of 
regulations associated with trading activity may have intensified the inherent 
procyclical bias of the market-based system that has evolved over the last 
several decades in the US. 
 
One of the requirements applicable to traded assets is that they be marked to 
market as prices change.   Unlike bank loans held in portfolio at face value, 
traded assets – including those held by banks – require charges against 
capital when their prices drop. As a result of the wider applicability of 
capital charges, the shrinkage in credit flows through banks and their re-
channeling through capital markets tended to exacerbate the pressure on 
capital as the sub-prime mortgage crisis spread.  And it increased the 
potential that this credit crisis would deteriorate into a solvency crisis more 
rapidly than in earlier periods and affect a wider group of institutions.    
 
Indeed, the resulting threats to the solvency of systemically important non-
depository institutions have made clear that the focus on banks’ capital 
position is incomplete.  The role of capital in a transformed, market-based 
system is a parallel concern.  Thus we argue that there is need to reexamine 
the role of capital in a systemic context and ensure that countercyclical 
capital requirements are developed that will bolster the soundness of all 
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financial institutions and activities. But we note that when and how much 
capital should be held by individual institutions is increasingly related to the 
level of liquidity in the system as a whole, as well as the level of their 
holdings of liquid assets.    
   
2.  Maintaining liquidity in a market-based system 
 
Because capital is a scarce resource and one that is automatically depleted 
when losses are written off, liquidity requirements were used by central 
banks and regulators as a critical tool to protect capital in the period before 
deregulation made such quantitative measures suspect.  The Federal 
Reserve’s recent call for investment banks to shore up their balance sheets 
with more liquid assets underscores the belated recognition that capital alone 
is an insufficient cushion against the threat of insolvency (Guerrera and van 
Duyn, 2008).  However, the Fed’s concern about illiquid balance sheets may 
come too late.  The systemic nature of the current crisis suggests that efforts 
by individual institutions or sectors to increase their holdings of liquid assets 
may be ineffectual if the central bank is unable to inject liquidity into critical 
markets. 
 
Designing a countercyclical regulatory system will require reexamining the 
role and effectiveness of liquidity requirements for individual institutions 
and sectors as well as the channels the central bank uses to provide liquidity.  
The shift from a bank-based to a market-based system has obscured the fact 
that, in the US before the 1980s, the systemic cushion for the financial sector 
was bank reserves.  One of the major reforms of the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913 was to require banks to hold a given percentage of their reserves with 
their regional Federal Reserve banks rather than as deposits with larger 
private banks in so-called “reserve cities”.  As the Federal Reserve System 
grew and evolved during the 1920s and 1930s, the Fed no longer required 
banks to pay-in reserves; it created and extinguished those reserves by 
undertaking open market operations on its own initiative.  Changes in 
reserves became the primary tool that allowed the Fed – as former Fed 
Chairman William McChesney Martin phrased it - to take away the punch 
bowl when the party got rowdy and bring it back in when spirits were 
flagging.  In other words, the overreaching objective that had evolved within 
the Fed itself in its formative years was a commitment to countercyclical 
monetary policy using bank reserves and open market operations as the tools 
for implementing that objective. 
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In 1951, when banks held 65 percent of financial sector assets and liabilities, 
their reserve balances with the Fed accounted for 11.3 percent of bank 
deposits and constituted a remarkably comfortable cushion for a segmented 
financial system in which banks loaned to other financial sectors with whom 
they were not then in competition.  Fifty years later, however, the shift in 
credit flows away from banks and banks’ use of borrowed funds and 
strategies such as sweep accounts to reduce holdings of deposits subject to 
reserve requirements had virtually wiped out that cushion.  By year-end 
2001, banks reserve balances had shrunk to 0.2 percent of their deposits and 
banks’ holdings of credit market assets had fallen to less than half the share 
they held fifty years before. 
 
The missing monetary cushion has weakened individual financial 
institutions and made them more vulnerable to stops in external funding. 
Borrowing and lending among financial institutions through repurchase 
agreements – another of the rapidly expanding markets developed as the 
system evolved – has ceased to be an efficient channel for distributing 
liquidity as institutions’ confidence in the solvency of their financial 
counterparties has eroded.  But the missing monetary cushion has also 
impeded the Fed’s ability to provide liquidity to the system as a whole. The 
Fed is attempting to address the collapse of liquidity in funding markets by 
continuing to swap treasuries for riskier securities, extending its emergency 
borrowing program to investment banks, and continuing to provide term 
loans to banks.   
 
A cushion of reserve balances owned by financial institutions but held by the 
Fed would be a far more effective way to alleviate the ongoing credit 
crunch.  The soundness of payments among financial institutions made by 
transferring reserve balances would not be questioned.  Moreover, reserve 
balances would retain their face value despite the erosion of asset prices.  
Thus an established pool of financial sector reserves held with the central 
bank would act as a more effective liquidity buffer than the Fed’s current ad 
hoc lending facilities because it would keep open the channels for private 
funding.   
 
But such a cushion would serve other important purposes as well.  The 
objective of the Fed’s current program of liquidity support is to moderate the 
pressure for asset sales, stem the decline in their prices and thus protect 
institutional capital.  While capital is and will remain a critical tool of 
soundness regulation as a cushion against insolvency for individual 
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institutions, capital alone cannot protect the financial sector as a whole in the 
event of a systemic crisis.  The Fed’s struggle to ensure a systemic reach for 
its efforts to provide liquidity suggests that, in the future, central banks 
should attempt to build a source of systemic funding within the monetary 
system that, like reserves, is renewable and will be immediately available to 
all financial sectors in a downturn.  Meanwhile, a new, system-wide reserve 
management regime would also restore the effectiveness of countercyclical 
monetary strategies – a reform we believe is no less important than the 
regulatory reforms we and others have proposed.5    
 
In summary, we argue that there is a critical link between liquidity and 
solvency; that liquidity protects solvency, and that financial stability will 
require reforms that include comprehensive, countercyclical regulatory and 




                                                          
5 For discussions of proposals to extend reserve requirements to all financial institutions and the balance 
sheet changes that would be required, see Thurow 1972; Pollin 1993: D’Arista and Schlesinger 1993; 
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